The rich body of experimental results that has appeared in the psychological literature in recent years (for reviews, see Cacciari & Glucksberg, 1994; Gibbs, 1994a) has changed our understanding of how non-literal statements such as metaphors are comprehended. Prior to that work the dominant view was that the comprehension of nonliteral statements involves two steps: first, it must be recognized that the statement makes no sense if interpreted literally; then its intended, non-literal meaning is computed by some kind of inference. Now we know that, instead, metaphors can be understood directly, like literal statements. A computational model of literal comprehension should therefore be able to understand metaphorical statements in the same way that it "understands" literal sentences.
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The rich body of experimental results that has appeared in the psychological literature in recent years (for reviews, see Cacciari & Glucksberg, 1994; Gibbs, 1994a) has changed our understanding of how non-literal statements such as metaphors are comprehended. Prior to that work the dominant view was that the comprehension of nonliteral statements involves two steps: first, it must be recognized that the statement makes no sense if interpreted literally; then its intended, non-literal meaning is computed by some kind of inference. Now we know that, instead, metaphors can be understood directly, like literal statements. A computational model of literal comprehension should therefore be able to understand metaphorical statements in the same way that it "understands" literal sentences.
In this paper I shall sketch a computational model of metaphor comprehension that treats metaphors in the same way as literal statements. I introduce this model with an example that Glucksberg used to present his view that metaphorical predication is basically the same as literal predication (Glucksberg, 1998) . According to Glucksberg, the metaphor My lawyer is a shark is a regular class-inclusion assertion, except that "the metaphor vehicle (shark) is used to refer to the superordinate category of predatory creatures in general, not to the smaller, concrete category of marine creatures that is also named shark" (Glucksberg, 1998, p. 41) . Thus, the metaphorical shark-propertiesvicious, predatory, aggressive, and tenacious -are attributed to lawyer, but the literal shark-properties -fast swimmer, has fins, has sharp teeth, has leathery skin, has gillsare not. The goal of the present paper is to show how such a process can be realized computationally. 
Metaphorical Predication 1
If metaphors are understood by people in much the same way as literal sentences, then metaphorical predication becomes a special case of predication in general. In this paper, a general computational theory of predication, which has recently been proposed by Kintsch (submitted) , will be applied to simulate metaphor comprehension. This theory has two basic components: a model of human knowledge structure provided by Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA), and a model of text comprehension, the constructionintegration (CI) model. LSA is a method for automatically constructing a highdimensional semantic space from the analysis of a large amount of written text. An introduction and further references are given by Landauer, Foltz, and Laham (1998) . The CI model is a psychological model of text comprehension that has been applied in a wide variety of situations (Kintsch, 1988; . The theory presented below is an extension and elaboration of Kintsch (1998, Chapter 5) and introduces a new way of modeling predication within the context of the CI -LSA framework (Kintsch, submitted) .
LSA (Landauer & Dumais, 1997 ) is a contextual theory of meaning in that it represents the meaning of a word by its relationships to other words in a semantic space.
To construct this semantic space, it analyses word co-occurrences in a large number of written documents. Specifically, the semantic space used in all the examples below is based on a corpus of some 37,000 documents containing over 92,000 different word types -a total of about 11 million word tokens. From this statistical input LSA generates a high-dimensional semantic space by means of a mathematical technique called singular value decomposition, followed by dimension reduction. Thus, while the input to LSA consists of occurrence patterns over contexts, LSA does not represent meaning in terms of co-occurrence frequencies, but as vectors in a semantic space of 300-400 dimensions.
The technique is related to factor analysis, but the dimensions of the space have no interpretation. The meaning of a word or sentence is represented by a vector of 300 numbers. This 300-dimensional space suffices to reconstruct not the accidental detail but the essential features of the original co-occurrence matrix and allows us to represent the meaning of arbitrary combinations of words and to compare them.
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To find out whether an LSA vector correctly represents our semantic intuitions, we must compare it with other vectors. For instance, to determine whether the vector for a word means what it is supposed to mean, we can compare it with other wordslandmarks -that we know to be related to it as well as with landmarks that we know are unrelated. We select these landmarks by our human intuition about the meaning of words and sentences; the question is whether LSA has the same kind of intuitions. Thus, we can compare the vector for the word shark with landmarks such as fins, dolphin, diver, and fish as well as some unrelated words. A quantitative measure of how close one vector is to another in the LSA space is given by the cosine between two vectors -a measure that can be interpreted in much the same way as a correlation coefficient. The cosines for shark and fins, dolphin, diver, and fish are .74, .74, .70, and .69, respectively. For comparison, the cosine between shark and lawyer is -. 01.
2
LSA successfully captures one aspect of meaning -the semantic distance among words. Of course, LSA, like any scientific theory, is not the real thing -not meaning, but a model of meaning. Furthermore, it is an incomplete model. It models only those aspects of meaning that are coded verbally; human meaning is derived from perception and action as well as words. However, language has evolved to talk about perception and action, and one should not underestimate the power of the word to encode the human world. In addition, LSA has other limitations. For instance, it fails to explain the nature of the relation between shark and its neighbors -that is, how we understand that a shark has fins, looks like a dolphin, is a danger to divers, and is a fish. Neither does LSA distinguish a shark is a fish and the fish is a shark. Thus, LSA is not a complete model of meaning, but the fact that it allows us to compute automatically a quantitative measure of the relatedness between these terms is useful nevertheless. LSA can be an essential component of a psychological theory of meaning in that it provides a model of knowledge structure and a model of knowledge acquisition, based on tracking data about usage in the environment. But it needs to be combined with psychological process models of comprehension and thinking so as to achieve a full account of psychological semantics. In the present paper, LSA is paired with the CI model of text comprehension.
This does not provide answers to all questions (e.g., it does not address the first of the limitations of LSA noted above -distinguishing between different types of relations) but selected intuitively to make a point, the model will be described in its general case, which does not require an intuitive selection of features and is fully automatic.
The predication algorithm selects neighbors of a predicate that are related to the argument of the predication that are used to modify the predicate vector in order to make it context sensitive. It uses a spreading activation process in the manner of the construction-integration model to select among the terms in the LSA space that are related to P those that are also related to A, and then uses these terms to augment the vector representing the meaning of the metaphor. The general conceptual scheme will be described first, and then a computational approximation will be presented. The general scheme has the advantage that it makes clear just how the CI-model is combined here with LSA. The approximation does not employ the CI-model directly, but simplifies the computations significantly and yields equivalent results.
The predication algorithm first selects terms from the LSA space that are related to the predicate P, and then selects from this set those terms that are also related to A.
The first step is achieved by computing the semantic neighborhood of P. The complete semantic neighborhood of a predicate P in the semantic space is a 300-dimensional hypersphere around P in which all 92,000 items in the semantic space are arranged according to their relationship with P. Items which have a high cosine with P will be near P, and items farther away are less and less related to P. In fact, most items will be at the periphery of the hypersphere centered on P, because they are essentially unrelated to P.
One can order all the items in the space according to their cosine with P, generating a list of m words ordered in terms of their cosine with P. activation values of P and A clamped at 1, most nodes will become deactivated and only those nodes related to both P and A will attain a positive activation value.
Finally, the k nodes with the highest activation values will be used to compute the vector representing the meaning of the metaphor. Specifically, the predication vector will be the centroid of A, P, and the k most highly activated terms of the network.
In actual computations, an approximation which greatly simplifies computations is employed for the second step described above. The sequence of steps in the computation of a predication vectors is therefore as follows:
1. Compute the semantic neighborhood of P of size m, as described above. For metaphors, m has to be fairly large (500 < m < 1500) because the predicate and argument in a metaphor often are quite unrelated. 5 This step assures that all terms that enter into the predication are in fact related to P.
2. The next step picks those terms from the neighborhood of P that are also related to A.
The cosines between the m neighbors of P and A are computed and the k terms with the highest cosine are selected. This step obviates the need for setting up a huge selfinhibitory network and yields much the same results because there are usually only a few items related to both P and A and these would be selected in either case.
3. It is not necessarily the case that terms related to both P and A exist. Thus, in order to avoid introducing noise by selecting the strongest terms even when their absolute strength is low, the terms selected must have a cosine with P and A above some minimum threshold. Only terms that have a cosine with P greater than two standard deviations above the mean for all words in the space used here (.02 + 2*(.06) = .14) will be included among the to-be-considered items. Similarly, all terms related to A with a belowthreshold cosine (<.14) will be eliminated.
4. The vector representing the meaning of the metaphor can then be computed as the centroid of A, and the terms selected above (P and the k terms from the neighborhood of P, subject to the restriction that their cosine with A is above threshold). the second set of three landmarks was chosen to be related to shark -the first two items to the here inappropriate fish-sense of shark, and the third to be appropriate for the metaphor. Other landmarks similarly related to lawyer and shark could have been used.
According to Figure 1 , predicating shark about lawyer does not change the sentence meaning with respect to the lawyer-landmarks, but introduces a little fishiness and, primarily, moves the sentence meaning toward viciousness.
For lower values of m, the predication procedure fails: for m = 100, the meaning of lawyer is not modified at all because none of the 100 closest neighbors of shark have a cosine with lawyer that is greater than .14, the threshold value. In accordance with the claims of Glucksberg (1998) , Kintsch (1998) When is a sentence a metaphor, when is it a literal statement, and when is it just plain meaningless? Further research within the framework proposed here might yield some novel answers, but at present only a few hints can be offered here. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate one important difference between metaphors and literal statements: for the latter, argument and predicate are usually related in that many features of the predicate apply to the argument; the predicate selects and emphasizes one or more of these potential features of the argument. In metaphors, only a few features need to be related.
In the case of My lawyer is a shark, topic and vehicle are not related at all by LSA (their cosine is -. 01). But for some metaphors, topic and metaphor can be related. For instance, of the 12 metaphors used in one esperimental study (Blasko & Connine, 1993) with the predication procedure was compared with two landmarks, one relevant to the intended meaning of the metaphor, and one irrelevant to the metaphor but strongly related to another aspect of the predicate. Where possible these terms were selected from the dictionary definition of the predicate term.
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The analysis yielded intuitively reasonable results in six out of the seven cases.
The mean cosine between the predication vectors and the relevant landmarks was .36, whereas the mean cosine between the predication vector and the irrelevant landmark was .22 The lawyer-example shown in Figure 1 falls well within the range of these examples.
In all six successful cases the cosine for the relevant landmark was greater than the cosine for the irrelevant landmark. This contrasted sharply with computations using the centroid of the argument and predicate as the vector representing the meaning of the metaphor: the cosines between the centroids and the relevant and irrelevant landmarks were approximately equal, .32 and .30, respectively. Thus, the predication algorithm selectively emphasizes appropriate semantic features of a metaphor, whereas the centroid imports relevant as well as irrelevant features of the predicate.
The predication procedure failed for the metaphor Her marriage is an icebox; the cosines between this metaphor and the relevant landmark cold and the irrelevant landmark refrigerator were both .03. There may be two reasons why predication failed in this case. First, LSA has very little information about icebox (vector length = .12, the lowest value in all examples), so that the neighborhood of icebox was rather vague and noisy. In addition, marriage is not related to cold and its synonyms in the LSA space used here, resulting in a failure of the selection mechanism. This lack of knowledge on the part of LSA is not totally surprising: the General Reading Space used here was constructed from a corpus consisting of the reading materials of an average high school student. It remains to be seen how well real high school students understand these metaphors. However, in future work, care must be taken to use words about which LSA is reasonably well informed; if the knowledge base is not there, the predication algorithm has nothing to work with.
The examples from Glucksberg et al. are, presumably, all examples of strong metaphors. What strong metaphors seem to have in common is that the predicate is a concrete term, rich in imagery and potential associations, and that the argument and predicate are relatively unrelated. The richness of the predicate allows the argument to resonate with several different features at the same time, resulting in a complex, if fuzzy, interpretation. The unrelatedness between the argument and predicate has surprise value.
A strong the metaphor is something unusual, a pleasant surprise. But it cannot be too Metaphor Comprehension 14 much of a surprise. The semantic feature that was emphasized by the metaphor must already be inherent in the argument, even if at a low strength. In all cases were LSA yielded satisfactory interpretations, the argument and the relevant landmark were not completely unrelated. Thus, the effect of the predication was to emphasize some dormant but potential feature of the argument.
Experimental Findings on Metaphor Comprehension
The model proposed here not only can compute intuitively reasonable interpretations of metaphors (and literal statements), but it also provides an account for some of the major phenomena that have been studied in the experimental literature.
Glucksberg (1998) serves as a good guide as to what these phenomena are.
Metaphors are in principle non-reversible. This is actually a claim that needs explanation. It really means two things:
(a) Some metaphors when reversed change their meaning. For example, My surgeon is a butcher and My butcher is a surgeon are both good metaphors but mean quite different things. This is not a problem for the present model, for in the one case properties of butcher are attributed to surgeon, and in the other properties of surgeon are attributed to butcher, as shown in Table 1 . Instead of the whole set of neighbors of shark, the illustrative properties noted by Glucksberg (1998) are used in Figure 3 to keep the example simple. To integrate the above network the lawyer node is clamped at 1; lawyer and shark-can-swim are assigned a starting value of 1, whereas all other nodes have a starting values of 0; where links are shown in Figure 3 , their strength is equal to the cosine between the respective nodes; in addition, there are links among all nine context nodes which were assigned a negative link strength in such as way that the absolute value of the total sum of the positive links equals the total sum of the negative links. Settling in this network requires 8 cycles, compared with 6 when the metaphor is understood out of context. That is not an impressive difference. But if one looks at the time course of integration, the experimental finding of slower comprehension with the prime becomes more understandable. In Figure   4 we see that if the metaphor is processed out of context, the lawyer relevant attributes dominate the integration process from the very beginning. In contrast, with the prime sharks can swim, the shark-specific attributes are stronger initially, and it takes several integration steps before this pattern is reversed. The final outcome is the same as without the prime, however. This agrees with the experimental findings of Glucksberg, Manfredini, and McGlone (1997) that people take more time to understand the primed metaphor, but arrive at the intended interpretation eventually. to settle, versus 11 in the context of the metaphorical prime. However, Figure 5 shows that the metaphorical prime initially activates context irrelevant features, so that their activation is actually higher than the activation of relevant features. It requires several cycles before this interference is overcome. Eventually, of course, Sharks are good swimmers is understood correctly, but as Gernsbacher, Keysar, and Robertson (1995) observed, it takes more time to so. 
The Predication Algorithm and Theories of Metaphor
The most salient result of the experimental psycholinguistic research on metaphor has been the finding that metaphors are understood directly, much like literal statements -a result widely accepted today. The model proposed here embodies this premise.
Indeed, the predication algorithm applies in the same way to literal and metaphorical predication. Several current theories of metaphor comprehension share this premise. For instance, this assumption is central to the theory of Glucksberg and Keysar (1990) and Glucksberg (1998) . But Glucksberg's category inclusion theory of metaphors goes further than that, in that it postulates the creation of abstract categories for which the vehicle of the metaphor serves as a token (shark as a token for the category predatory creatures). This may or may not be a good description of the predication algorithm proposed here:
Glucksberg's theory requires a mechanism by means of which the topic of the metaphor is assigned to a newly created category. The vehicle of the metaphor names this category and also serves as the prototypical, defining member of that category. The predication algorithm is consistent with such a theory (if one accepts a very broad definition of the notion of category), but it certainly does not require it. Similarly, the present computational model is consistent with other theories of metaphor, without being dependent on them. For instance, Ortony's salience-imbalance theory (Ortony, 1979) defines metaphors in terms of particular relationships between topic and vehicle: a good metaphor is obtained when a property is associated with both the topic and the vehicle, but it is more salient in the vehicle, or when a term has low associations with both. There is nothing in the present model that restricts interpretations to these cases, but further research with the predication algorithm might show to what extent Ortony's claims can be substantiated.
It might seem that the present model is a member of the class of semantic feature models that treat metaphors as a comparison in the tradition of Aristotle and I. A.
Richards (for a discussion, see Gibbs, 1994b) . In this view, the inadequacy of which has been pointed out by Gibbs (1994b) and others, a feature associated with the vehicle is transferred to the topic. For instance, the feature fierce of wolf is transferred to man by the metaphor Man is a wolf, resulting in a meaning much like the literal statement Man is fierce. A problem with this view is that often there is no pre-existing association between the transferred feature and the vehicle. Gibbs (1994b) No claim is made that the mechanism of the present model is the only one involved in metaphor comprehension. There are metaphors that demand more controlled analysis, especially literary metaphors, for example, in terms of analogical reasoning.
Indirect comprehension of metaphors must certainly be possible: people can, and sometimes do, speculate about the meaning of a metaphor. It is also possible that judgements of the aptness of metaphors might involve processes other than those involved in comprehension. There are no reasons why the present model would be incompatible with additional processes that might also play a role in metaphor comprehension.
Conclusions
The predication model of metaphor comprehension described here has three components. First, LSA provides a model of human knowledge that is objective and quantitative and can be used as the basis for a computational theory. Second, the CI theory is a suitable cognitive architecture for modeling the dynamics of comprehension.
It allows us to adapt the general, context independent knowledge space of LSA to a particular context, in effect selecting from a large number of potential features of the vehicle precisely those that apply to the topic. Third, it offers a specific model of metaphor comprehension, by assuming that metaphoric predication works just like literal predication. None of these three components is new. LSA has been used to model human knowledge before (Landauer & Dumais, 1997) ; the CI architecture has provided the framework for a number of successful models of comprehension processes (Kintsch, 1998) ; and the claim that literal and metaphoric predication are alike has been supported by a number of researchers (e.g., Kintsch 1998, Chapter 3; Glucksberg, 1998 ; for more detail see the review articles cited earlier). What is new here is how these three components have been conjoined into a computational theory of metaphor comprehension that yields intuitively reasonable interpretations of metaphors and that accounts qualitatively for some of the major experimental results that have been obtained in this field. 1 The discussion in this paper is restricted to attributional metaphors of the form "A is P,"
where A is the topic of the metaphor (the argument of the underlying proposition) and P is the vehicle of the metaphor (the predicate of the proposition). The theory presented is a general one, however, and the extension to other forms of simple predication is straightforward.
2 All computations are based on the General Reading Space with 300 dimensions and can be performed at the LSA web site, http://lsa.colorado.edu. In general, only the relative values of cosines are readily interpretable, but not their absolute values.
3 LSA has proven to be a powerful tool for modeling psychological phenomena such as simulating the rapid acquisition of vocabulary (Landauer & Dumais, 1997) , categorization (Laham, 1997) , the analysis of textual coherence and practical applications requiring the representation of meaning, such as essay grading , helping students to write summaries (E. Kintsch et al., in press), selecting instructional materials suitable for a student's background knowledge (Wolfe et al., 1998) , and selecting personnel with the knowledge required for specific jobs (Laham et al., in press ). 4 The Nearest-Neighbor/term program available at the LSA web site does exactly that.
5 For literal sentences, much smaller values of m are sufficient, e.g. m = 20 (Kintsch, submitted) . 6 The centroid of lawyer and shark reflects shark-properties more strongly than lawyer properties because the length of the shark vector is greater than the length of the lawyer 
